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Abstract
One main result about the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a monopolist is that
an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement. This note provides two
examples showing that this proposition cannot be generalized to an oligopoly with heterogenous firms.
In these examples, price discrimination makes competition more favorable to the low cost firm. This fact
induces a cost saving that overcome the welfare loss from consumer misallocations associated to price
discrimination.
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I Introduction
One of the well-known conclusions about the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a mo-
nopolist is that “an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement.” To avoid rep-
etition, in our paper this is called “proposition WO,” or simply, “WO.” Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985),
and Schwartz (1990) proved WO with different levels of generality. This note shows that, although WO is
valid for a monopolist, it does not extend to every situation with more than one firm.
The logic ofWO is clear. There is a consumer inefficiency associated with third-degree price discrimina-
tion: output is not optimally distributed to consumers because their marginal utilities will be unequal. With a
change from uniform price to price discrimination, units of the good are taken away from consumers with a
higher valuation of the good, and given to consumers with lower willingness to pay. PropositionWO asserts
that the only way to overcome this consumer inefficiency is a sufficient increase in total output. This is true
when there is only one cost function. But, with heterogeneous firms, cost saving by a better redistribution
of output among firms can also overcome the consumer surplus inefficiency. When this is the case, it is no
longer true that welfare must fall if output decreases when price discrimination is introduced.
Some papers challenge proposition WO. Adachi (2002, 2005) shows that WO may not hold in the pres-
ence of consumption externalities. One example of these externalities is a bar that gives discounts on drinks
sold to women to attract more women, hoping to attract more men as well. The willingness to pay of men
increases with the number of women. However, an improvement in welfare due to positive externalities is
not a big surprise.
Yoshida (2000) refers to proposition WO because his result is in stark contrast with it, but not because
it is in opposition to it. In Yoshida’s model, an upstream monopolist, by price discriminating, can induce
production inefficiencies by increasing the price of its product to the more efficient downstream firms, and
lowering its price to the less efficient firms. In this way inefficient firms increase their production and
efficient firms reduce it. Yoshida shows that with price discrimination total welfare is reduced when the
aggregate production of the final good is increased: exactly the opposite of WO. But, in Yoshida’s model
there is no consumer inefficiency to overcome, which is the source of inefficiency in proposition WO. Be-
sides, propositionWO refers to consumer inefficiencies, that get worse when total quantity is reduced, while
in Yoshida’s model, price discrimination in the input market generates production inefficiencies, that get
aggravated as output rises. Yoshida proves that, in his model, these inefficiencies overcome the increase in
value due to a higher production.
To our knowledge, the welfare effects of price discrimination when competition is present have been
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studied (see Stole (2003) for a good survey), butWO has never been challenged when more than one firm is
introduced. Holmes (1989, note 2) is right when he states, without proof, that WO “holds for this oligopoly
analysis”, because in his paper each firm produces with the same constant average cost. Corts (1998)
considers consumer welfare and firm profit, but does not attempt an analysis of the relation between a
reduction in output and welfare. Armstrong and Vickers (2001), when considering WO in duopoly, assume
symmetric and constant marginal costs between firms. Stole (2003), citing a previous version of this paper
–see Galera (2003)–, is aware of the problem of the possible influence of asymmetric costs in WO. As most
models suppose symmetric costs among firms, sometimes it is affirmed thatWO is true more generally than
the monopoly case, without reference to the costs. See, for example, Layson (1994, p. 323).
The plan of this note is very simple. In the next section we present the examples, and we finish the paper
with some conclusions.
II The examples
Both examples present a homogeneus good industry with two firms. One of the firms, Firm L has low cost
and the other, Firm H, high cost. They compete in quantities. Consumers can be divided into two separate
markets. There are also two possible price regimes: price discrimination, whose variables we denote with a
hat (for example Q̂), and uniform price: we use a bar to denote these variables, for instance p¯.
II.1 A Cournot duopoly
Example 1. Our first example is a Cournot duopoly. Both firms have constant marginal cost, c= cH > cL =
0, and sell in two distinguishable markets A and B. In market A, demand is QA = Ap−a, with a ≤ 1. In
market B, demand is QB = Bp−b, also with b ≤ 1. That is, both market demand curves are of the constant
elasticity type, and both inelastic. We will show that, within a whole range of values of the parameters a and
b, propositionWO is no longer true. To prove it, we present three propositions in this example. The first one
provides some useful results for the Cournot oligopoly. The second states that total output is always reduced
with the introduction of price discrimination for all the relevant parameter values. And the last result says
that welfare is reduced for some values of the parameters.
Proposition 1 In a Cournot duopoly, where firms H and L have constant marginal cost c = cH > cL = 0,
the price and equilibrium quantities, if they exist, satisfy the following equations:
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(1) qL = εQ; qH = (1− ε)Q.
(2) p=
c
2− 1ε
Proof. For k = L,H, the profit of firm k is pik(qk) =
(
P(Q)− ck)qk−Fk, where Fk is the fixed cost.
The first order condition is: P′(Q)qk+P(Q)− ck = 0. Arranging from here, as cL = 0, P′(Q) ≡ 1/Q′(p),
and ε ≡−pQ′(p)/Q, we have equation 1. Adding the first order conditions across firms, we get P′(Q)Q+
2P(Q)− c= 0, and thus, −p/ε+2p− c= 0. Rearranging, we obtain expression 2. 2
Without loss of generality, we normalize the equilibrium uniform price to be p¯= 1. We get the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 If 0.5< a< 1, 0.5< b< 1 and a 6= b, then total output is reduced; if a> 1, b> 1 and a 6= b,
total output is increased.
Proof. First we get total output in both regimes. As p¯ = 1, in the uniform price market total output is
Q= A+B. With price discrimination, total output is Q̂= Apˆ−aA +Bpˆ
−b
B . Now we find the normalized cost.
In the whole market, at uniform price p¯= 1, elasticity is easily seen to be ε¯ = (aA+bB)/(A+B). Applying
equation (2) to this market, we get that
(3) c= 2− A+B
aA+bB
=
A(2a−1)+B(2b−1)
aA+bB
.
And finally we get the equilibrium prices. Applying again equation (2) to markets A and B, with elastic-
ities a and b respectively, we get
(4) pˆA =
ac
2a−1 , pˆB =
bc
2b−1 .
Now, we will use a generalization for real exponents of the Bernouilli inequality –see, for example,
Weisstein, E. W., (2005). This inequality states the following: “If 0 6= x>−1 and 0< a< 1 are real values,
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then (1+ x)a < 1+ax; if 0 6= x > −1 and a > 1, then (1+ x)a > 1+ax.” It is clear that if x = 0, or a = 1,
the inequality becomes an equality. In order to apply this inequality to our purposes, we need to know that
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pˆk
−1>−1 for k= A,B. Under our hypothesis, this is clear because as 0.5< a and 0.5< b, then c> 0 and
pˆk > 0 for k = A,B. Now, with some algebra, we obtain:
(5)
1
pˆA
=
2a−1
ac
= 1+
1
pˆA
−1= 1+B a−b
a(A(2a−1)+B(2b−1)) .
A similar expression can be obtained for 1/pˆB. Applying the Bernoulli inequality, for a< 1 and b< 1,
we have:
(6) pˆ−aA =
(
1
pˆA
)a
< 1+B
a−b
A(2a−1)+B(2b−1) ;
and
(7) pˆ−bB =
(
1
pˆB
)b
< 1+A
b−a
A(2a−1)+B(2b−1) .
These inequalities are valid for all the parameter values, except when a = b. Total output with price
discrimination is:
(8) Q̂= Apˆ−aA +Bpˆ
−b
B < A(1+B
a−b
A(2a−1)+B(2b−1))+B(1+A
b−a
A(2a−1)+B(2b−1)) = A+B.
This result proves the proposition. That is, total output is reduced under price discrimination. It is clear
that if a< 1 and b= 1, total output is also reduced. With a> 1 and b> 1, it is easy to get the inverse result.
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Now, we proceed to our last result for this example.
Result 1 When A = B, for all values with a and b over the curve in Figure 1, and not in the diagonal,
welfare is increased when price discrimination is introduced. A similar result is valid when A 6= B.
Proof. We have already got the equilibrium prices, p¯, pˆA pˆB. For these prices, we will now compute
changes in the set of variables that have an influence on welfare. Total income with uniform price is A+B.
As elasticity is ε¯ = (aA+bB)/(A+B), total cost is c(1−a)A+c(1−b)B. So, total profit is p¯i = A(1−c(1−
a))+B(1−c(1−b)). With a price discrimination regime, total income in market A is pˆAApˆ−aA = Apˆ1−aA , and
total cost is c(1−a)Apˆ−aA . Total profit is the difference between these values, pˆiA = Apˆ1−aA − c(1−a)Apˆ−aA .
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For market B the expressions are similar. The increment in consumer surplus (CS) is:
(9) ∆CS=
∫ 1
pˆA
Ap−adp+
∫ 1
pˆB
Bp−bdp= A
1− pˆ1−aA
1−a +B
1− pˆ1−bB
1−b .
We have then that the welfare gain is
(10)
∆W = ∆CS+ pˆiA+ pˆiB− p¯i = Aa1−a(1− pˆ
1−a
A )+Ac(1−a)(1− pˆ−aA )+
Bb
1−b(1− pˆ
1−b
B )+Bc(1−b)(1− pˆ−bB ).
Fixing the parameters A and B, total increment in welfare is ∆W =W (a,b). We have tried without
success to simplify analytically ∆W . But, although this function W (a,b) is not simple, it can be studied
with numerical methods. We representW (a,b) = 0 in Figure 1 for A = B. It is easy to show, by numerical
example, that the values of a and b over these curves violate proposition WO. 2
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
II.2 Partial competition
This example has the following economic rationale. Suppose that a high cost firm, Firm H, can sell only in
a segment of the whole market. If a lower cost firm, Firm L, that operates in the whole market, is bound to
a uniform price, then Firm L will suffer, in the whole market, the consequences of competition with firm H
in H’s particular market. Hence Firm L may prefer a soft competition with Firm H. This strategy of Firm L
allows Firm H to expand its production. The result may be an inefficiency in production. If we allow price
discrimination, then Firm L can limit the contest with Firm H to H’s own segment, without hampering its
profit in the other segments of the market. Thus, with price discrimination this inefficiency is avoided. This
situation is parallel to that studied by Gelman and Salop (1983), but changing capacity limitations to market
demand limitations.
Example 2. There are two markets, A and B, with demands Q= a− pA and Q= b− pB. There are also two
firms. Firm L has zero costs and sells in both markets. Firm H sells only in market A and has a constant
marginal cost that we normalize to c = 1. Let qA, qB be the quantities of the first firm in both markets
and xA the quantity of the second firm. There is Cournot competition in market A. We find the following
proposition:
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Proposition 3 For all points (a,b) inside the triangle with vertices (2,2), (2, 5417) and (5,4), total output is
reduced and welfare is increased, when price discrimination is introduced.
Proof. Whatever price restrictions Firm L has, Firm H maximizes piH = (a− 1− xA− qA)xA at xA =
1
2(a−1−qA). That is, xA = a− xA−qA−1, or
(11) xA = pA−1.
With uniform pricing, both markets must have the same price. That is, p¯= a− q¯A− x¯A and p¯= b− q¯B.
Then Firm L maximizes: p¯iL = p¯(a− x¯A− p¯+ b− p¯) at p¯ = 14(a− x¯A+ b). Applying equation 11, x¯A =
p¯−1, we obtain p¯= (a+b+1)/5. With price discrimination is easy to see that the equilibrium prices are
pˆA = (a+1)/3 and pˆB = b/2. We can use equation 2, or any other method, to find them.
Now we proceed with welfare. Total willingness to pay in market A is 12a
2− 12 p2A, for whatever price
regime. The increment in total willingess to pay in this market is thus (p¯2− pˆ2A)/2. The same is true for
market B. As the cost of firm H is 1, total cost, by equation 11 is x¯A = p¯− 1 with uniform price, and
xˆA = pˆA−1 with price discrimination. Applying all this, we find the increment in welfare to be
(12) Ŵ −W = p¯2− 1
2
(
pˆ2A+ pˆ
2
B
)
+ p¯− pˆA.
The increment of output in the industry is Q̂−Q= a− pˆA+b− pˆA− (a+b−2p¯) = 2p¯− pˆA− pˆB. With
some algebra we find that:
(13) Q̂−Q= 2a−3b+2
30
; and Ŵ −W = 51b−14a−134
60
2a−3b+2
30
.
If the values of a and b satisfy 2a+23 < b<
14a+134
51 , then Q̂< Q and Ŵ >W . Firm H will sell a positive
quantity only if a > 2. These inequalities mean that for all (a,b) inside the triangle of vertices (2,2),
(2,54/17) and (5,4), welfare is increased with reduction in output. An example of a point with integer
values in this triangle is a= 3 and b= 3. 2
III Conclusion
We conclude with only one remark. It is known for a monopolist that an increase in total output is a
necessary condition for welfare improvement. This proposition presents a test that only requires knowledge
6
of observable magnitudes. But to have policy relevance, the policy-maker should be sure that this proposition
is still valid under imperfect competition, because pure monopolies are rare. The extension to oligopoly
has not previously been revoked because most papers on price discrimination with imperfect competition
deal with symmetric cost firms. Unfortunately, this note shows that a generalization is not possible with
heterogeneous firms. Then, the policy-maker needs knowledge of variables such as costs; and costs are
often hard to measure.
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Figure 1: A Cournot model with A= B
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